Middle East Media

I came across a video produced by Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s al-Furqan media group this weekend. It was posted earlier this week in a jihadist internet forum, but is now also available on YouTube. The video is the third part of a series entitled, “The Knights of Martyrdom”.

While I haven’t seen part 2, I have seen the first one, which was issued back in March of 2007.  From what I remember, many aspects of this most recent episode are consistent with that of the previous one, using many of the same sound-bites, motifs, and production techniques.

Contrary to the timing of this part’s release, the attacks covered in the film date back as far as the summer of 2005. Perhaps the most significant of these was the destruction of both the Badush and Aski-Mosul bridges in the province of Ninawa in May of 2007 in multiple VBIED attacks.  The incident was covered by western media, which revealed that it was part of a larger campaign undertaken by the group in that region.

In its entirety, the film covers several attacks, with each segment featuring the execution of the attack, a scorecard of its achievements, and video footage of a will read by an individual killed in the operation. In addition to the bridge operations, several attacks allegedly executed in Tal Afar are also featured, including one that appears to date back to July of 2005. While much of the details of the attacks are highlighted, the dates of their execution are not presented to the viewer. However, anyone able to cross-reference some of the information provided in the videos with mainstream sources could come up with the dates of the attacks.

Part 3 of “The Knights of Martyrdom” comes at a time when AQI, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq, has experienced serious setbacks in Iraq over the past year, which has most recently taken on the form of a serious crackdown on the group in its last known ’stronghold’ of Mosul.

This might be why AQI has featured dated footage in this episode of the video series, leaving one to conclude that - by presenting itself in this manner - AQI is attempting to maintain a  media presence that suggests operational strength in order to compensate for its losses on the ground. One might also conclude that this may be  indicative of AQI’s  inability to produce media content derived from the ‘field’ in a timely manner. Such a scenario could be the result of efforts to take down al-Furqan dating back to late last year.

Thus, this latest episode of the “Knights of Martyrdom” may be more indicative of an organization on the decline, rather than one on the rebound. In terms of its media campaign, highlighting major attacks - such as the Badush bridge operation - may ensure the group visibility. However, it also opens the door for the public to refer to mainstream media coverage of those events to delineate inconsistencies and unflattering trends in the group’s capacity as both a military and media entity.

A report in yesterday’s As-Safir covered a recent press conference given by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. According to the pro-opposition Lebanese daily, al-Assad voiced that the US’s role in any future peace deal with Israel is essential, and is one that cannot be matched by any European country. He stated that this is primarily due to the US’s close relationship with Israel, who he believes is more serious - ‘to a certain extent’- about peace than it was in 2000.

His comments came shortly before his departure for France to meet with French President Nicolas Sarkozy, to whom he attributes the improvement in Franco-Syrian relations. In Paris, the Syrian president will also be taking part in a Mediterranean summit and will be meeting with new Lebanese President Michel Suleiman. Under Jacques Chirac, relations between Syria and France went cold, especially after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

The Syrian president also made a few comments on security cooperation with the US. He claims that, although Syria attempted to cooperate with the US on counter-terrorism after 9-11, the two countries did not agree as to who should be leading such operations. According to al-Assad, after security relations with the US were cut off in early 2004, Syria refused US attempts to have the relations reestablished, stating that there would be “No security relations [with the US] without political relations.”

US media reported this relationship ending in May of 2005 against the backdrop of of the Hariri assassination and Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. Note that Syria has served as a port of entry for Iraq-bound insurgents/foreign fighters since the beginning of the war.

Although it’s not clear if the Iraq situation is specifically what al-Assad is referring to here in terms of cooperation, it’s likely that Syria will continue to bank on its ‘utility’ in counter-terrorism operations, and in curbing the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq, as a means to facilitate a form of US participation in future talks with Israel that is more conducive to its interests.

Sorry it’s been a few days since my last blog entry. I’ve been busy travelling, and have also had some serious computer issues to deal with.

Anyways, I came across an interesting report featured on the Dutch-funded Menasset.com. It covers a conference recently held between journalists from both  Hamas and Fatah factions addressing media issues that have helped sustain and promote internal conflict.

The Palestinian ambassador to Egypt said internal media awareness is necessary to help settle the internal political crisis. The article also takes note of how internet-based media have facilitated increased tensions between constituents of the two opposing camps.

Although fair and balanced reporting amongst professional journalists would be a contributing factor to any internal rapprochement between the two parties, in my opinion, internet-based media promoting violence may prove too elusive to curb.

In response to a proposed US Congressional resolution to label the Hamas-affiliated Al-Aqsa TV a terrorist entity, the head of the channel’s administrative council said on Thursday that the resolution goes against international regulations and conditions for media freedom, insisting that the channel plays an important role in informing the Arab/Islamic Ummah on the Palestinian issue.

He also claims the resolution only serves the interests of Israel and the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority (PA), who he accuses of arresting journalists affiliated with the channel and shutting down its offices in the West Bank. According to Reporters Without Borders, a journalist and cameraman affiliated with the station were arrested by the PA in November of 2007.

Some have compared Al-Aqsa TV to Hezbollah’s Al-Manar satellite television network, which was also labeled a terrorist entity, and was subsequently banned from being broadcasted in the US and parts of Europe back in 2006. Although known for being controversial, Al-Aqsa’s programming and capabilities are somewhat rudimentary when compared to its Hezbollah ‘counterpart’. I’m pretty sure Al-Manar is the second most popular satellite channel in the Occupied Territories (after Al-Jazeera), so perhaps the two may eventually become competitors for Palestinian viewers.

The issue of securatizing media outlets by labeling them terrorist entities brings up an interesting debate. Is it an effective way of countering violence/terrorism? Or does it represent a naive attempt by policymakers to address ‘root causes’ of terrorism within a politicized context?

Is today’s bulldozer attack in Jerusalem indicative of a developing trend in terrorist tactics in the West Bank?

Similar to the March shooting that killed eight Israelis at a religious school in Jerusalem, various Palestinian groups took credit for today’s attack that involved a Palestinian man running a Caterpillar front loader into traffic and pedestrians. This includes the mysterious Ahrar al-Jalil group, who also took credit for the March shooting. A statement they released today states that the perpetrator of the attack was allegedly recruited by the organization in February of this year. While the group sometimes refers to itself as the “Imad Mughniyeh Group” after Hezbollah’s assassinated paramilitary leader, it’s not clear if there is any true operational link between the Palestinian group and Hezbollah.

While it remains unclear who actually carried out the attack and their political affiliation, what’s interesting is that individuals have been employing low-tech and non-traditional means to hit soft (civilian) targets. Given the highly securitized nature of the West Bank, this could just be a natural progression since more formal terrorist networks, employing traditional means (i.e. explosives), are easier to screen and detect. Employing shadowy groups and/or individuals with no apparent links to such networks could also be a way to deflect any political fallout from such brutal attacks. Meanwhile, the psychological impact of these low-tech attacks is perhaps just as significant as that resulting from a more typical suicide bombing on a bus or in an open market.

The front page of Al-Akhbar’s Tuesday edition features news of the upcoming release of a Hezbollah music video celebrating the second anniversary of the July War of 2006. Subsequently, the name of the of the video is tammuz, which translates simply as July. According to the pro-opposition Lebanese daily, the picture at the bottom of this post was taken during the video’s production. The profile depicted on the flags is that of the group’s assassinated paramilitary leader Imad Mughniyeh.

This is not the first time that Hezbollah has produced a music video commemorating the ‘06 conflict. Last July, the group released one entitled, “The Victory of the Arabs”. The video frames the July War as an Arab victory through its imagery and message in an effort to capitalize on Hezbollah’s standing as the only Arab force to have ‘defeated’ Israel. You can read more about it in an article I wrote here, while those who wish to view the video can do so here: link

At this rate, it appears that Hezbollah will be releasing a new music video every July. It might be hard though to top the level of production work and resources that went into the making of “The Victory of the Arabs”. According to Al-Akhbar, members of the Lebanese Army participated in this year’s video. Therefore, I’m thinking that they’ll go for a more nationalistic angle this time around. I’ll try to post a copy of the video once it’s available online.

UPDATE: The new video can be viewed here on YouTube.

The 11th Arab conference on combating terrorism was held this past week in the Tunisian capital of Tunis. The two-day event, convened by the Council of Arab Interior Ministers, brought together officials from the region’s counter-terrorism establishments to address various issues stemming from terrorism. In addition to the council, representatives from the Arab League and the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS) participated in the conference, while it was also reported that a meeting of Arab terrorism experts was held on its sidelines.

At the opening of the event, the Secretary General of the Council of Arab Interior Ministers stressed the role of social and religious institutions in countering the grassroots aspect of the jihadist terrorism phenomenon. He also called for increased cooperation between the security services and news agencies in discouraging violence and promoting a ‘culture of peace’. The agenda also included discussions on tackling terrorism financing and examining developments in the structures of terrorist organizations.

At the conclusion of the conference, Al-Hayat reported that officials urged religious figures/clerics to play an increased role in countering ideologies propagated by extremist groups. It also cited a source as stating that recommendations to strengthen coordination between Arab security services on terrorism will be raised at next year’s annual conference of Arab interior ministers.

Providing for some political spin, Syria’s SANA News Agency states that Syrian representatives at the event called for the organization of a conference aimed at distinguishing between legitimate resistance groups defending against occupations and terrorist organizations. This is not surprising given its relationship with Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as its classification as a state sponsor of terrorism by the US State Department.

While not mentioned specifically, one would imagine that the issue of terrorist networks/individuals from the various Arab states partaking in the Iraq conflict might be a cause for concern, assuming that they may return home to setup shop or join up with domestic-based groups. This was the case for many Arab members of the Afghan jihad in the early 1990’s who resettled in Egypt and Algeria.

There are other groups today, such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Algeria) - whose pedigree can be traced to the Afghan Arab jihadists - that have already taken root domestically. Perhaps the complexity of the terrorism threat, one comprised of entities with varying capabilities and centers of gravity, warrants a comprehensive approach towards the threat in the region. Thus, grassroots initiatives aimed at the ‘war of ideas’ within domestic social and religious institutions, combined with regional cooperative efforts to dismantle and disrupt networks, could be viewed as key components of an effective counter-terrorism strategy for the Arab states.

According to the Palestinian Ma’an News Agency, the Hamas-led government in Gaza threatened to take measures against anyone who violates the ceasefire. This came in response to a rocket attack launched by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades against the Israeli town of Sderot. Hamas claims that the Al-Aqsa Brigades, an armed wing of the group’s political rival Fatah, was not acting on behalf of the Palestinian national interest, and its actions could jeopardize the ceasefire by providing Israel with a pretext for maintaining the embargo against Gaza.

While the Al-Aqsa Brigades claim the attack was in response to Tuesday’s killing of a PIJ commander and the ceasefire not being extended to include the West Bank, could this move in fact be part of a Fatah strategy to exploit the Gaza truce to its own political advantage?

Ma’an also reported the formation of a crisis unit, comprised of various Palestinian factions, to monitor the truce. The creation of the body was announced by Sa’id Siyam, described as the Foreign Minister of the Hamas-run de facto government. While the creation of a multi-party monitoring unit is a step in the right direction, it seems that the current truce in Gaza will indeed test the ability of the Palestinian factions to maintain some semblance of unity over the conditions of the ceasefire. Is Hamas capable of leading such an effort?

In response to an IDF operation that killed two in the West Bank town of Nablus early this morning, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militants claimed to have fired three rockets from the Gaza Strip at the Israeli town of Sderot. Israeli sources confirm that rockets did hit the town, lightly wounding two. One of those killed in the IDF raid was a key leader in the group’s Al-Quds Brigades, while the other was a university student who Haaretz reported as belonging to Hamas.

Technically speaking, the IDF raid is not a violation of the current ceasefire agreement, which took effect last Thursday in Gaza. While Palestinian parties tried to have it extended to the West Bank before the agreement was finalized, Israel refused so that it could continue to undertake security operations in the area (see my previous post on the truce).

Hamas, who controls Gaza, denounced the IDF operation as a crime. However, the group’s spokesperson asked that all Palestinian factions exercise self-control and remain committed to national consensus on the ceasefire issue. He went on to add that Hamas is looking into today’s incident with the other Palestinian factions, and he called on designated parties to exert pressure on Israel to cease such actions.

For now, it appears that Hamas is trying to reign in other Palestinian factions in order to salvage the much needed truce. Subsequently, PIJ’s website has termed the rocket attack as an ‘exceptional response’, and voiced the group’s ‘committment’ to the truce (as long as Israel abides by it) and Palestinian consensus. Overall, the circumstances surrounding PIJ’s retaliation is evident of the limits of the truce, and the future challenges that both sides will face in the coming days.

Here’s a YouTube link to Al-Jazeera’s English coverage of the recent clashes in the Lebanese port city of Tripoli. Note that the fighting between the residents of the largely Alawite Baal Mohsen and the predominantly Sunni Beb al-Tabbaneh neighborhoods is reminiscent of the 1980’s when, during the civil war, the same areas were respectively split between their support for the Syrian Army and Fatah.

Although the Lebanese Army moved in on Monday evening to help restore order, don’t be surprised if things heat up again.