However, the article states that this is should not be taken as an indication the Jordanian government is deviating from its policy of supporting a two-state solution and its strategic alliance with the US. It goes on to mention meetings that were held between officials from the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) and Hamas representatives last month, a development that was reported in more detail by Al-Ghad at the end of last month. These meetings were apparently significant since Hamas’s own media office in Jordan was closed and its representatives in Jordan forced to leave the country in 1999 (Note: the picture above was taken around the time of their expulsion).

Ammon’s report suggests that both parties are playing a delicate game of improving their positions in the pursuit of their interests while maintaining their traditionally outspoken, and often opposing, agendas. In exchange for Jordan exercising more neutrality in Palestinian issues, the author indicates that Hamas will cease instigating tensions within Jordan via its relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist groups in the country who were recently weakened in controversial parliamentary and municipal elections.

Overall these developments suggest that as Hamas takes on a more active role as a domestic Palestinian political actor, it also has the ability to influence trends outside the Occupied Territories. However, despite the apparent necessity for both parties to improve relations with one another, one might question if this ‘mutual’ feeling will survive any downturn in either regional or local tensions.

This move by Hezbollah will likely be cause for concern within Saad Hariri’s Future Movement in that it can be seen as an attempt by Hezbollah to garner support from a constituency whose support has been previously sought and enjoyed by Hariri. Overall, this move could be motivated by a desire for Hezbollah to increase its influence in the predominantly Sunni north Lebanon for the upcoming 2009 parliamentary elections.

(Updated) According to Al-Akhbar’s coverage of these developments, leadership of the salafist Waqf al-Turath al-Islami (Endowment for Islamic Heritage) has been holding meetings with Hezbollah representatives the past few months. Al-Akhbar cites sources allegedly close to the organization as stating that many within the salafist community are expected to attend Monday’s announcement. When compared to salafist-jihadist groups, Waqf’s political line can be considered relatively moderate. For example, I came across a fatwa issued by the organization in November of last year - allegedly distributed to mosques in the Tripoli area - that discouraged individuals from embarking for jihad in Iraq.

The memorandum comes shortly after a bus bombing killed 9 members of the Lebanese Army in the northern city of Tripoli, in which many have alleged the involvement of a salafist-jihadist group (i.e. Fatah al-Islam). However, this move should be seen within the broader context of ongoing sectarian clashes between Sunnis and Alawites in Tripoli. The Alawites of the Bal Mohsen sector of the city have be painted as acting on behalf of the Hezbollah-led opposition. Thus, this move can be seen as an important political move to improve/build the group’s credibility in north Lebanon. In some regards, its reminiscent of the 2006 MOU between Hezbollah and the largely Christian Free Patriotic Movement, which proved to be vital to the strength of Lebanon’s parliamentary opposition in recent political developments.

Will this new inter-sectarian ‘understanding’ further solidify Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon, or will it only further subject it to the norms of Lebanese national politics?

Since 40 percent of the world’s oil passes through Hormuz, it’s blockage would likely send oil prices soaring. Subsequently, the article argues that, while Iran claims that it has the ability to easily shutdown the strait, such a move would be foolish since it would unite the international community against it. The author even goes on to describe the statement as the hangman’s ‘rope’ around Iran’s neck.

The negative response to Iranian threats to blockade the strait leads one to ponder whether it will prove to be an asset or a liability for Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran closes down the strait, GCC-member states may be compelled to advocate for US military action against Iran. Ironically, while the GCC has previously used the ‘oil weapon’ to economically weaken Iran, the council’s dependency on oil power itself might force it to plea for US military intervention in the event that Iran moves to close the Strait of Hormuz.

While the replenishment and expansion of Hezbollah’s artillery rocket arsenal has repeatedly been cited since the end of the 2006 conflict, perhaps the most important recent development has been its alleged acquisition of anti-aircraft missiles. This comes as Israel’s cabinet was presented with an assessment today of the Hezbollah threat and as the group has voiced its desire to end Israeli Air Force (IAF) sorties over Lebanon. The group’s ability to do this may threaten the IAF’s ability to conduct reconnaissance flights over Lebanon, as well as its ability to provide air support to ground troops in Lebanon in the event of another conflict.

Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV subsequently issued a report today touching upon these alleged developments, claiming they have created anxiety within Israel’s security establishment. An article in the Lebanese pro-opposition daily Al-Akhbar also speculated - citing an Israeli media report - that today’s cabinet meeting in Israel would reveal a discouraging security situation. The article also cited Israeli media reports published at the end of last week  indicating that Hezbollah was working to put into place Russian-made SA-8 (currently found in Syria) and SA-15 (further developed in Iran) missile systems.

It appears that the advancement in Hezbollah’s military capabilities have become increasingly worrisome since it coincides with an expected Lebanese cabinet policy statement granting the group the right to keep its weapons. Thus, while fears over Hezbollah’s ability to achieve both strategic and political victories may lead to an Israeli military response, such a response would likely be surgical and limited in its nature in order to avoid giving the group any increased political capital, which would likely result from significant collateral damage and civilian casualties.

According to the PIC report, a police explosives expert stated that some of the devices collected in search operations match those involved in the bombing near Gaza beach last week, an event which triggered the outbreak of violence between Hamas and Fatah factions.

Police claim that militants took refuge in an area of Gaza City inhabited by the Halas clan, the members of which are pro-Fatah and have previously clashed with Hamas. Members of the clan reportedly include a leading Fatah official in Gaza, and were involved in clashes with police yesterday.

While police apparently aimed to incriminate the Halas clan in last weeks bombing, the family issued a statement a few days ago denying any involvement in the incident.

Today’s report comes a day after Al-Quds reported that Israel had allowed members of the Halas clan - accused of being involved in a bombing in June - to take refuge in Israel as they headed to the West Bank. However, the AP also indicated that President Mahmoud Abbas told Fatah fighters  to return to Gaza, insisting that a Fatah presence be maintained there. It’s not clear, however, if the fighters mentioned in the AP report were also affiliated with the Halas clan.

Hamas’s apparent attempt to implicate the Halas clan in last week’s bombing could be part of an ongoing campaign to eradicate Fatah’s foothold in Gaza City. It also suggests that clan identities, and how they interplay with political affiliations, need to be taken into account when understanding the nature of the conflict in Gaza.

Subsequently, this has been met with raids by Fatah-allied Palestinian police against Hamas elements in the West Bank.

While Hamas-allied police forces in Gaza state that increased security measures are necessary to maintain the peace, Fatah’s leadership in Gaza has termed these measures as being ‘random’ and not serving the interest of national security.

In addition to revitalized Fatah-Hamas tensions that have followed these events, Al-Jazeera’s coverage also states that Hamas-allied police and the Army of Islam, an allegedly al-Qaeda-affiliated group based in Gaza famous for its kidnapping of British journalist Alan Johnston last year.

While these events reveal the complex nature of the security situation in Gaza, there are reportedly indications that Egypt will initiate talks between Fatah and Hamas in an effort to diffuse the situation. However, the overall situation is indicative of the extent to which the security sectors in the West Bank and Gaza have diverged along political lines.

According to Al-Jazeera’s reporting, today’s attack took place close to the hotel where Barack Obama is due to stay during his visit, the area around which has subsequently witnessed heightened security measures in recent days. Ironically, the first to respond to the incident was a civilian licensed to carry a firearm, not the police.

It’s worth noting that the resources that enable one to undertake such an attack are perhaps too diffuse for the authorities to completely control or monitor, even in the West Bank. The fact that the perpetrators of these attacks had the ability to move freely within Israel and the Occupied Territories also suggests that this type of threat cannot be countered by increased restrictions/closures at entry points into the West Bank.

If this trend takes on a political face it would raise some interesting questions, such as:  Is there an effective way to counter this type of threat? And, would it enable second-tier terrorist groups, ones that don’t possess significant resources, to compete for the limelight?

Overall, I’d say the presentation of Quntar’s persona and narrative in this program is representative of how the notion of Arab ‘resistance’ has evolved over the decades as multifaceted concept. At the time of his capture in the 1970’s Quntar was representative of the garden variety resistance fighter of that time; a Lebanese Druze who took up arms on behalf of the Palestinian cause by joining the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) organization. In fact, he is described by the presenter as being Lebanese by birth, Palestinian in mind and spirit, Arab in association, and a believer in the path of resistance since the age of 15.

This notion of Palestinian-led Arab resistance has given way today to Hezbollah’s own ‘resistance’; one that fluctuates between having a Lebanese, Islamist, and Arab face. So perhaps it’s appropot that Quntar was released as a result of Hezbollah’s efforts as today’s vanguard of ‘resistance’ in the Arab world. Now, as a de facto spokesperson for the organization, he may even be seen as representing Hezbollah’s ever-evolving political goals and interests.

However, one then might ask how long can Hezbollah ride the resistance wave afforded by the Palestinian issue?  Would the eventual release of more prisoners and a Palestinian-Israeli peace deal jeopardize it’s ability to regionalize its influence?

Footage of Nasrallah’s appearance at this event can be seen here on YouTube. After greeting the prisoners, he gives the crowd a quick pep talk, telling them how they’ve shown everybody that they cannot be defeated. In a joking manner, he then promises the crowd that he won’t later be speaking on the screen for too long as he usually does.

In addition to four Hezbollah prisoners taken during the 2006 war with Israel, the exchange also included Samir Quntar, a Lebanese individual who belonged to a Palestinian militant group. While Hezbollah was not yet formed when Quntar was captured in 1979, his status as a ‘resistance’ figure propelled him into the spotlight in the group’s ongoing campaign to free prisoners from Israeli jails. This effort culminated with the group’s attempt to take additional Israeli prisoners for leverage in the summer of 2006, which sparked the war of that summer. Given Quntar’s unique status, it perhaps comes to no surprise that he was outfitted with new Hezbollah gear for the celebration ceremony.

On a side note, an interview with one of the Hezbollah prisoners involved in the deal, Ali Hassan Suleiman (who was captured during the 2006 war), is available here. Note, I can’t vouch for the commentary provided by the person who posted the video, but the translation is relatively accurate. The interview, apparently done while Suleiman was incarcerated, provides some insight into the background of Hezbollah fighters.

In Nasrallah’s televised speech later on, he stressed that the three major factors that led to the release of the prisoners were the steadfastness of the Resistance, the secrecy of the Israeli prisoners’ status, and the weakness of the enemy. The release of the prisoners will likely encourage Hezbollah to shift its focus to the territorial disputes of Shebaa Farms and the Kfar Shouba Hills. While these issues could be settled through third-party intermediaries, the momentum gained by Hezbollah as a result of the prisoner swap won’t likely motivate them to take a conciliatory stance on these territorial grievances.

Al-Jazeera.net is conducting an interesting survey. In light of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates’ recent decision to name ambassadors to Iraq, the network’s website is asking for feedback from its viewers on the issue.

While sending ambassadors to a fellow Arab nation may not seem controversial at first, the questions being asked in the survey imply that many may view this move by the two Gulf states as implicitly condoning the occupation of Iraq, as well as obligating other Arab countries to follow their lead.

For example, it asks “Is it necessary for the Arab states to follow suit with the two countries?, and, “Do you think that naming ambassadors to Baghdad grants legitimacy to the Occupation there?”.

One respondent from the UAE, identifying himself as an academic political figure, condones his country’s move, pointing to the importance of the Arab countries to establish their agenda in Iraq in the face of a competing Iranian one. He sees the UAE as opening the door for this process to take place.

Another, identifying himself as a political analyst from Egypt, claims that the US is applying pressure on the Arab states to undergo these steps in order to legitimize its presence in the country, while at the same time he acknowledges that such action by the Arab states may send a message of solidarity.

Meanwhile, a Syrian author and journalist states that establishing diplomatic ties in Iraq should be considered a national duty for the Arab states, adding that diplomatic representation is a positive step towards a safer political/security situation there.

While responses to the survey are not yet many, they are extensive and provide some insight into how Arabs perceive Iraq as a regional issue. Despite the stigma of the occupation and alleged US pressure, there may be a general understanding that the Arab states need to become more involved in Iraq’s future. Given the prospect of increased Iranian influence in Iraq, the need for an increased Arab presence in Iraq may be taking on strategic importance as well for many of the Arab states, especially those in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).