Middle East Media

In response to a proposed US Congressional resolution to label the Hamas-affiliated Al-Aqsa TV a terrorist entity, the head of the channel’s administrative council said on Thursday that the resolution goes against international regulations and conditions for media freedom, insisting that the channel plays an important role in informing the Arab/Islamic Ummah on the Palestinian issue.

He also claims the resolution only serves the interests of Israel and the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority (PA), who he accuses of arresting journalists affiliated with the channel and shutting down its offices in the West Bank. According to Reporters Without Borders, a journalist and cameraman affiliated with the station were arrested by the PA in November of 2007.

Some have compared Al-Aqsa TV to Hezbollah’s Al-Manar satellite television network, which was also labeled a terrorist entity, and was subsequently banned from being broadcasted in the US and parts of Europe back in 2006. Although known for being controversial, Al-Aqsa’s programming and capabilities are somewhat rudimentary when compared to its Hezbollah ‘counterpart’. I’m pretty sure Al-Manar is the second most popular satellite channel in the Occupied Territories (after Al-Jazeera), so perhaps the two may eventually become competitors for Palestinian viewers.

The issue of securatizing media outlets by labeling them terrorist entities brings up an interesting debate. Is it an effective way of countering violence/terrorism? Or does it represent a naive attempt by policymakers to address ‘root causes’ of terrorism within a politicized context?

Is today’s bulldozer attack in Jerusalem indicative of a developing trend in terrorist tactics in the West Bank?

Similar to the March shooting that killed eight Israelis at a religious school in Jerusalem, various Palestinian groups took credit for today’s attack that involved a Palestinian man running a Caterpillar front loader into traffic and pedestrians. This includes the mysterious Ahrar al-Jalil group, who also took credit for the March shooting. A statement they released today states that the perpetrator of the attack was allegedly recruited by the organization in February of this year. While the group sometimes refers to itself as the “Imad Mughniyeh Group” after Hezbollah’s assassinated paramilitary leader, it’s not clear if there is any true operational link between the Palestinian group and Hezbollah.

While it remains unclear who actually carried out the attack and their political affiliation, what’s interesting is that individuals have been employing low-tech and non-traditional means to hit soft (civilian) targets. Given the highly securitized nature of the West Bank, this could just be a natural progression since more formal terrorist networks, employing traditional means (i.e. explosives), are easier to screen and detect. Employing shadowy groups and/or individuals with no apparent links to such networks could also be a way to deflect any political fallout from such brutal attacks. Meanwhile, the psychological impact of these low-tech attacks is perhaps just as significant as that resulting from a more typical suicide bombing on a bus or in an open market.

The 11th Arab conference on combating terrorism was held this past week in the Tunisian capital of Tunis. The two-day event, convened by the Council of Arab Interior Ministers, brought together officials from the region’s counter-terrorism establishments to address various issues stemming from terrorism. In addition to the council, representatives from the Arab League and the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS) participated in the conference, while it was also reported that a meeting of Arab terrorism experts was held on its sidelines.

At the opening of the event, the Secretary General of the Council of Arab Interior Ministers stressed the role of social and religious institutions in countering the grassroots aspect of the jihadist terrorism phenomenon. He also called for increased cooperation between the security services and news agencies in discouraging violence and promoting a ‘culture of peace’. The agenda also included discussions on tackling terrorism financing and examining developments in the structures of terrorist organizations.

At the conclusion of the conference, Al-Hayat reported that officials urged religious figures/clerics to play an increased role in countering ideologies propagated by extremist groups. It also cited a source as stating that recommendations to strengthen coordination between Arab security services on terrorism will be raised at next year’s annual conference of Arab interior ministers.

Providing for some political spin, Syria’s SANA News Agency states that Syrian representatives at the event called for the organization of a conference aimed at distinguishing between legitimate resistance groups defending against occupations and terrorist organizations. This is not surprising given its relationship with Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as its classification as a state sponsor of terrorism by the US State Department.

While not mentioned specifically, one would imagine that the issue of terrorist networks/individuals from the various Arab states partaking in the Iraq conflict might be a cause for concern, assuming that they may return home to setup shop or join up with domestic-based groups. This was the case for many Arab members of the Afghan jihad in the early 1990’s who resettled in Egypt and Algeria.

There are other groups today, such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Algeria) - whose pedigree can be traced to the Afghan Arab jihadists - that have already taken root domestically. Perhaps the complexity of the terrorism threat, one comprised of entities with varying capabilities and centers of gravity, warrants a comprehensive approach towards the threat in the region. Thus, grassroots initiatives aimed at the ‘war of ideas’ within domestic social and religious institutions, combined with regional cooperative efforts to dismantle and disrupt networks, could be viewed as key components of an effective counter-terrorism strategy for the Arab states.

According to the Palestinian Ma’an News Agency, the Hamas-led government in Gaza threatened to take measures against anyone who violates the ceasefire. This came in response to a rocket attack launched by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades against the Israeli town of Sderot. Hamas claims that the Al-Aqsa Brigades, an armed wing of the group’s political rival Fatah, was not acting on behalf of the Palestinian national interest, and its actions could jeopardize the ceasefire by providing Israel with a pretext for maintaining the embargo against Gaza.

While the Al-Aqsa Brigades claim the attack was in response to Tuesday’s killing of a PIJ commander and the ceasefire not being extended to include the West Bank, could this move in fact be part of a Fatah strategy to exploit the Gaza truce to its own political advantage?

Ma’an also reported the formation of a crisis unit, comprised of various Palestinian factions, to monitor the truce. The creation of the body was announced by Sa’id Siyam, described as the Foreign Minister of the Hamas-run de facto government. While the creation of a multi-party monitoring unit is a step in the right direction, it seems that the current truce in Gaza will indeed test the ability of the Palestinian factions to maintain some semblance of unity over the conditions of the ceasefire. Is Hamas capable of leading such an effort?

In response to an IDF operation that killed two in the West Bank town of Nablus early this morning, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militants claimed to have fired three rockets from the Gaza Strip at the Israeli town of Sderot. Israeli sources confirm that rockets did hit the town, lightly wounding two. One of those killed in the IDF raid was a key leader in the group’s Al-Quds Brigades, while the other was a university student who Haaretz reported as belonging to Hamas.

Technically speaking, the IDF raid is not a violation of the current ceasefire agreement, which took effect last Thursday in Gaza. While Palestinian parties tried to have it extended to the West Bank before the agreement was finalized, Israel refused so that it could continue to undertake security operations in the area (see my previous post on the truce).

Hamas, who controls Gaza, denounced the IDF operation as a crime. However, the group’s spokesperson asked that all Palestinian factions exercise self-control and remain committed to national consensus on the ceasefire issue. He went on to add that Hamas is looking into today’s incident with the other Palestinian factions, and he called on designated parties to exert pressure on Israel to cease such actions.

For now, it appears that Hamas is trying to reign in other Palestinian factions in order to salvage the much needed truce. Subsequently, PIJ’s website has termed the rocket attack as an ‘exceptional response’, and voiced the group’s ‘committment’ to the truce (as long as Israel abides by it) and Palestinian consensus. Overall, the circumstances surrounding PIJ’s retaliation is evident of the limits of the truce, and the future challenges that both sides will face in the coming days.

The Palestinian Ma’an news agency featured a report today on its English language website that provides an overview of how both Palestinian and Israeli newspapers have been responding to the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, which took effect in Gaza on Thursday morning.

People on both sides have voiced some skepticism as to whether the Egyptian-mediated truce will last. However, the general consensus appears to be, for the time being, that both Palestinians in Gaza and their Israeli neighbors are relieved by the respite from hostilities. In fact, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh (pictured above) reportedly took the time to play football at an indoor arena in Gaza. According to Ma’an, the picture appeared in the Israeli Ma’ariv daily under an article entitled, “He left the trenches”.

One potential sticking point, highlighted in Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the ceasefire, is Israel’s refusal to give in to Palestinian demands for the cessation of hostilities to be extended to the West Bank. According to Al-Jazeera, Israel stressed that it must be allowed to conduct security operations in the West Bank against militants. Thus, while all major Palestinian factions have voiced their commitment to the truce, the potential for the outbreak of violence is still very real in the West Bank. An analyst for Al-Jazeera suggests that groups based in Gaza may retaliate if operations against militants in the West Bank result in Palestinian casualties.

Such a scenario would perhaps test the ability of the leadership of the various Palestinian factions to maintain control over their subordinates, and the ability of the factions to remain united in adhering to the ceasefire. The failure to do so would jeopardize the much needed truce in Gaza, which could then result in the reimplementation of a crippling economic embargo, as well as a resumption of violence between Palestinian groups and Israel.

Al-Jazeera’s English website featured a report over the weekend that suggests political divisions within the Palestinian cause are exacerbating a deteriorating situation in the Gaza Strip. The report comes on the first anniversary of Hamas’s takeover of Gaza, and claims that many within the Palestinian press have voiced their frustration with the current situation.

A Hamas official is cited as stating that Palestinian society has become more politically polarized. The report also references a poll by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) that indicates Hamas and its leaders have also experienced a decline in popularity. According to the Al-Jazeera, this internal political crisis has coincided with 100,000 lost jobs in Gaza since June of last year due to factors stemming from Israel’s blockade.

Apparently, the situation in Gaza is becoming problematic for Hamas whose electoral campaign in 2006 was largely built on a platform that vowed to improve the quality of life for Palestinians. However, any political rapprochement between the factions would likely have to coincide with some sort of economic stimulus/relief in Gaza in order to create an environment conducive for a long-term internal compromise.

In terms of internal dialogue, the Palestinian Ma’an news agency mentioned today that a Fatah delegation from the West Bank would be arriving on Tuesday to meet with its branch in Gaza. The delegation aims to discuss with its Gaza-based members President Mahmoud Abbas’s call for dialogue with Hamas… so perhaps part of the equation is beginning to be addressed.

A report by the Hamas-affiliated Palestinian Information Center (PIC) voiced the group’s firm disapproval of statements made by Sen. Barack Obama during his speech at AIPAC’s annual policy conference on Wednesday. While some suggest that the Arab world was ’shocked’ by his comments, Hamas took particular offense to how the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee stated that Jerusalem would remain “the undivided capital of Israel.”

The fate of Jerusalem is a touchy subject. Arguments for some Palestinian control of the holy city have come into play in past peace negotiations since Israel took over East Jerusalem in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War, which effectively extended its control to cover the entire city.

In response to Obama’s comments, the PIC quotes an unnamed Hamas representative as saying, “Although we recognize that some of the statements given by the nominees for the American presidency are within the context of the electoral campaign and its competitors, and the nominees are usually bent on winning voters for their side, the Hamas movement does not accept that the rights of the Palestinian people are subject to the American electoral ‘auction’, and thus expresses its utter disapproval and refusal of what was put forth in statements given by Barack Obama…”

What’s interesting about Hamas’s response is not the fact that the group unsurprisingly disagreed with Obama’s comments, but that the official then goes on to point out, much like the candidate’s own political adversaries, Obama’s relative lack of experience in politics in an attempt to discredit his stance on the issue.

The Hamas official states, “What’s necessary for Obama to recognize… this novice young man in politics, is that rights are not nullified… and the settler colonization needs to cease…What ancient and contemporary history has confirmed is that colonial powers [come to] an end… Jerusalem will be - with the Almighty’s permission - the undivided capital of Palestine.”

It seems that Hamas feels it necessary to give the young presidential hopeful a history lesson of sorts from their school of thought. However, Obama’s immediate ‘backtracking’ on his comments at the AIPAC conference shouldn’t be taken as an indication that he’s adhering to Hamas’s advice, but rather as a sign that the candidate - following widespread Palestinian criticism - has perhaps come to appreciate the sensitivity of the issue and its importance to any future peace settlement.

Will Hamas-Syrian relations be affected by the Arab state’s recent Turkish-mediated talks with Israel? According to a report on AlJazeera.net, Syria’s dependency on groups like Hamas and Hezbollah for power, and the shifting of the strategic landscape in its favor, may dissuade the Arab state from distancing itself from these militant groups. The report features commentary provided by Palestinian analysts and a Hamas spokesperson on this issue.

One specialist on Islamic movements suggests that Syria would be unwilling to give up its “points of power” that it depends upon through groups such as Hamas. Given that any deal on the Golan Heights would likely demand the Arab state to break its relationship with Hamas, it is unlikely that Syria would be willing to pay such a price. Another analyst argues that Syria is in a better strategic position than it was in past talks, while Israel and America have experienced setbacks. Thus, in his opinion, the military successes of groups like Hezbollah have only increased the value of these groups to Syria, leading him to declare that Syria’s relationship with these groups will only be reinforced through these talks.

Meanwhile, a Hamas representative affirms that the group’s relationship with Syria will not be affected by the talks, as was the case in previous negotiations with Israel. He states, “Syria knows how to look after its interests while it seeks the return of the Golan, and it also knows how to preserve its relations as a state of steadfastness and durability that has safeguarded its land and people.”

However, can’t this also be seen as the most ideal time for Syria to cash in on its ties with militant groups and its increased leverage? Perhaps, the question then becomes a matter of how Syria’s relations with Iran would be affected by such a move.

A report published last week by the Hamas-affiliated Palestinian Information Center (PIC) claims that the security measures being carried out by the pro-Fatah Palestinian police force are part of a campaign targeting the Palestinian resistance in the West Bank. The report, which dubs the force heading this effort the “Abbas-Fayad Apparatuses” in reference to the acting president and prime minister of the Palestinian government, came days after clashes broke out between the Western-backed security force and militants from Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the town of Qabatiyeh.

An unidentified officer in the police force is cited as saying that the campaign will target elements of the resistance, namely Hamas and PIJ, in Qabatiya, the city of Jenin, and the nearby Jenin refugee camp. The alleged source indicates that the police force seeks to conduct surveillance of resistance groups in Jenin in an effort to arrest and disarm militants. According to the report, Qabatiyeh has been the scene of previous unsuccessful attempts by the Palestinian police to subdue elements of Hamas and PIJ. The town, known for being a haven for militants, has previously been subject to IDF operations as well. Citing an unidentified resident of the Jenin refugee camp, the report suggests that any operations conducted by the pro-Fatah police force in the camp would constitute a grave transgression given the symbolic value of the camp to the Palestinian resistance.

The report goes on to state that the security force received training in Jordan provided by US and Jordanian forces. This comes after mainstream reports indicated that Palestinian Presidential Guard police officers involved in the Qabatiyeh operation were trained in a US-funded program. The PIC report subsequently cites a Hamas official who claims that the police force is carrying out the orders of the US and Israel in order to defeat the Palestinian resistance. This suggests that such security measures taken by the pro-Fatah force will be portrayed by Hamas as being on behalf of outside interests, rather than that of Palestinian security.