Middle East Media

Here’s a YouTube link to Al-Jazeera’s English coverage of the recent clashes in the Lebanese port city of Tripoli. Note that the fighting between the residents of the largely Alawite Baal Mohsen and the predominantly Sunni Beb al-Tabbaneh neighborhoods is reminiscent of the 1980’s when, during the civil war, the same areas were respectively split between their support for the Syrian Army and Fatah.

Although the Lebanese Army moved in on Monday evening to help restore order, don’t be surprised if things heat up again.

According to the pro-opposition daily As-Safir, there appears to be some anticipation over potential changes in Lebanon’s security services.

The paper reported on Monday that the new president Michel Suleiman called for decisions to oversee ‘balance’ within the ranks of the country’s Internal Security Forces (ISF) during a meet and greet with several leaders from the security service. Note, the ISF has often been painted as a pawn of the Hariri bloc by the pro-opposition press, especially its intelligence branch.

Suleiman is also quoted in the story as confirming, “the importance of re-activating the leadership of the ISF within the framework of ‘national unity’, [in order] for all resolutions to be based upon the rules of national balance, which forms the true guarantee of our national unity”. If true, this could be translated as Suleiman pressing for a reshuffling of sorts.

However, while pro-majority papers also reported on the meeting, no mention was made of Suleiman’s signaling for changes in the ISF in the spirit of ‘national unity’.

Coincidentally, this was followed on Tuesday by a report in As-Safir indicating that alleged long-awaited promotions will be given in both Lebanon’s ISF and directorates of General and State Security in the coming days. As-Safir cited ISF head Gen. Ashraf Rifi as stating that these promotions have been delayed due to administrative issues.

These developments come as the country’s cabinet is in the process of being formulated, which may also bode changes in ministries key to Lebanon’s security services, such as that of the Interior Ministry. Lebanon’s security establishment has become highly politicized in the wake of the Hariri assassination as the result of both events on the ground and corresponding media spin. However, whether or not As-Safir’s reportage on these developments is accurate, key security posts and ministerial seats may very well become additional points of contention between the March 14 and March 8 coalitions in the near future.

The pro-opposition Lebanese daily As-Safir featured an article yesterday illustrating how Hezbollah is dealing with the political fallout of its recent “small war” against the country’s ruling majority. Despite the potential political risks involved with this move, the author states that the group apparently saw its actions as worth taking in order to safeguard its status as ‘The Resistance’ in the long-term. Nonetheless, he asserts that the group now sees it necessary to contain the effects of the battle at both the “political and psychological levels”.

Allegations that the group’s campaign sparked sectarian tensions between Beirut’s Sunnis and Shias - a key criticism leveled by the group’s opponents - are addressed as well. In fact, the author states that Hezbollah refuses to concede that its “preemptive strike” is what awoke these sectarian sentiments. Instead, its representatives argue that other parties had previously been working to “activate” these emotions, and continue to do so even after the cessation of fighting in Beirut, thus implicitly attributing culpability to entities within the pro-government March 14 coalition for any sectarian discord.

In an apparent attempt to downplay the physical impact of the group’s takeover, an unidentified Hezbollah party official compares the damage left in the wake of the event to the marks left behind from laser surgery, rather than scars that would result from the “cutting open [of one’s] stomach”, stating that a mark “here or there” was left on the body of Beirut, not a “severe hemorrhaging wound” that would require years of treatment. However, the article also states that members of the pro-government Future Movement contend that the violence did inflict serious damage by deepening differences between Hezbollah and the Sunni ’street’.

In the aftermath of this ’surgical procedure’, the article states that Hezbollah is now working diligently to prevent the renewed polarization of Shia-Sunni differences, accusing the majority of exaggerating talk of sectarian discord in order to use it as a “profitable commodity” in the Sunni street to rally against the opposition. It is alleged that such an environment would then be employed by the majority at the ballot box in future parliamentary elections to make “political gains” and to collect “electoral dividends”.

In order to address the concerns of Beirut’s citizens regarding the events of May, Hezbollah has allegedly started to consult with the city’s local entities and governing bodies to clear the air. The article also states that phone lines have also been kept open to receive any complaints, while the party is also preparing to meet with the Union of Beirut Families to discuss these matters. Simultaneously, Hezbollah’s representative, Amin Shiri, is said to be consulting with concerned parties in Beirut in order to explain the true motives behind Hezbollah’s actions. He is to stress that the group’s takeover was an act of self-defense to prevent the Resistance from being stabbed in the back in “broad daylight” by the government’s two controversial decisions: the dismantling of the group’s communications network and the removal of a pro-opposition official as the head of airport security.

Now that the feuding parties appear to have reached a compromise via the Arab-sponsored Doha talks, will Hezbollah’s ‘damage control’ strategy help facilitate a smooth transition towards normalcy? Perhaps, only time will tell whether or not the wounds endured in the May conflict will reopen once again.

Here’s an interesting report featured on the Beirut-based, and Dutch-funded, Menassat.com. It touches upon the double-edged sword of new media in conflict zones. Some argue that while this technology might contribute to transparency by enabling “citizen journalism”, it may also stir sectarian strife by enabling individuals to publicize incidents of political violence. Alexandra Sandels takes a look at the camera phone-to-YouTube coverage of recent events in Lebanon here.

Hezbollah’s Al Manar TV boasted yesterday that various groups and individuals in the Arab world have pledged solidarity with the leading Lebanese-based opposition group in its current showdown with Lebanon’s Western-backed ruling majority. This claim coincidentally comes shortly before a Qatari-led delegation from the Arab League is scheduled to arrive in Beirut Wednesday to help diffuse the crisis.

The report cites an alleged letter of support signed by Jordanian figures including former ministers, party and trade union leaders, and even former PLO leader Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya. The signees address Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah as the leader of the “Arab resistance in the Arab nation” and pledge their solidarity with group in a conflict they term as the product of American-Israeli hegemony in the region – not internal sectarian strife. The letter also hails former pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud and opposition presidential hopeful Michel Aoun as “guardians of the Arab resistance in Lebanon”. It’s worth noting, however, that before being published in Hezbollah-affiliated papers, the letter was first featured in the Jordanian alternative web-based publication Ammon News where it received, at best, mixed reviews from its online readership.

While the letter may not be representative of Jordanian public opinion, the Al Manar report also cites leaders of various Islamist groups across the region who have also pledged their support for Hezbollah at this pivotal time. This includes the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, its cousin the Islamic Action Front in Jordan (whose Secretary General is listed as a signee of the above mentioned letter), and Algeria’s Movement for National Reform and Islamic Renaissance Movement. However, based on the commentary of these leaders, this support for Hezbollah in the current domestic political crisis is premised solely upon its status as a regional military bulwark against American and Israeli interests. The words of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt’s Supreme Leader Muhammad Akef cited in the report exemplify this line of reasoning when he states, “The Lebanese Resistance is the only group that defines what is in the interest of Lebanon since it prevented the American-Israeli project from penetrating Lebanon.”

While its support from the ‘Arab street’ was significant during its confrontation with Israel in the summer of 2006, in terms of the current situation in Lebanon, it’s not clear that any regional credibility the group may enjoy as a resistance force will either a) help counter its image as a Shia entity acting on behalf of Iranian interests, or b) provide it with added leverage in Arab-mediated talks. However, if Israel was to take on a more physical role in the current crisis, grassroots Arab support could become more of a reality and a factor for Hezbollah.