Middle East Media

Reuters reported today that the US is on the verge of striking a $7 billion missile deal with the UAE, pending Congress’s approval. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is believed to be sought by the UAE in order to prepare for a potential Iranian missile attack that may come in retaliation to a US or Israeli strike. It is the first missile system designed to counter both short and long-range ballistic missiles in and out of the earth’s atmosphere. Lockhead Martin and Raytheon are the two primary entities behind THAAD.

Al Jazeera.net also picked up on the report which has elicited a significant number of responses from its Arabic-speaking audience.

Some support the UAE’s decision to pursue this level of defense, citing the state’s right to defend itself against a seemingly formidable enemy just miles away on the other side of the Persian Gulf.  Others disagree, stating that Iran is not a strategic threat, and such an expensive arms package will only benefit the companies providing the weapons as well as the US and Israel’s strategic interests. One respondent interestingly suggests that the US is merely following the lead of the British and French who reportedly struck multi-billion dollar arms deals with the UAE in 1996.

In fact, news of this potential deal comes months after France announced that it would be establishing a naval base in Abu Dhabi (the largest and wealthiest of the emirates) following years in which it has solidified two $3.4 billion deals supplying the UAE with tanks and aircraft.  Thus, the US is not the only country interested in enhancing the UAE’s defense capacity and cultivating/maintaining a strategic presence in the Gulf. Given its location near the Strait of Hormuz, it’s no wonder why many are eager to do so.

One should note that the animosity between Abu Dhabi and Tehran predates the latter’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. The UAE and Iran have long been at odds over disputed island territories in the Persian Gulf (pictured above). Tensions have, however, escalated in recent weeks over Abu Musa after Iran established offices on the island. Iran has also recently test-fired long-range ballistic missiles reportedly capable of hitting Israel.

So while it may be months before the THAAD deal gets the green light and materializes, the necessity of military power has long been a concern for the UAE. Overall, these circumstances, and the history of international arms deals to the UAE, suggest that the THAAD system would be a natural progression for the Emirates as Iran is perceived to be increasingly hostile and capable. However, whether or not such a deal will be to the strategic benefit of the UAE remains long to be answered.

Lebanese MP Saad Hariri, the head of the country’s Future Movement and leader of the March 14 coalition, is in Tripoli this weekend meeting with local officials and representatives in an effort to diffuse the ongoing violence between Sunni (Bab al-Tabaneh) and Alawite (Jabal Mohsen) neighborhoods of the city.

A special report published yesterday by Hezbollah’s Al-Manar television casts a disingenuous light over Hariri’s visit, stating that it resembles his previous election campaign maneuvers (i.e. 2005) to garner Sunni support from the country’s north. It asserts that Hariri is actually on a mission to mobilize support against Syria, citing his claims of alleged Syrian involvement in the ongoing violence in Tripoli, as well as his view that the situation is intended to serve as a pretext for Syria’s reentry into Lebanon.

The report doubts whether Hariri’s reconciliation effort will indeed include meetings with leaders from the Alawite side, including representatives from Jabal Mohsen and the head of the largely Alawite Arab Democratic Party.

Meanwhile, the pro-March 14 Naharnet news highlighted Hariri’s more recent talks with the party’s leader Rifaat Eid today, in which it suggested that reconciliation may be close at hand.

Al-Manar’s depiction of Hariri above (featured with the report) is one that speaks to the political value of the Tripoli situation, and is what initially caught my attention.

Here he is pictured in a palatial parlor room (perhaps at his residence in Koreitem) against the backdrop of chandeliers with his hands casually tucked in his pockets. The blood-red image of Lebanon, with Tripoli indicated in the north, contrasts sharply with the relatively soft palette of Hariri’s portrait. In something more characteristic of a Canali advertisement, Hariri is presented as one more concerned with the finer things in life than the demands of the ‘people’, and as one far removed from the harsh reality of Tripoli’s streets today.

Such a depiction is not surprising given Hariri’s exceptional wealth, and his status as a prime political adversary of the Hezbollah-led opposition. Meanwhile, his efforts to reach out to the Alawite community of Tripoli this weekend, in which he vowed to help keep them safe from ‘external tampering’, is an indication of how the situation in Tripoli has perhaps acquired increased political importance.

Tripoli, a largely Sunni city, has also been a key support base for Hariri, and is thus an area from which Hezbollah undoubtedly seeks to gain increased support with the 2009 parliamentary elections approaching. In fact, Hezbollah last month signed a memorandum of understanding with Sunni Muslim salafist groups. This effort, however, ultimately fell apart.

While it’s doubtful that Hariri’s influence in the area will be undermined, the situation in Tripoli could be utilized against Hariri if he is perceived as being powerless in diffusing the situation or biased  in favor of the Sunni population of the city. These developments lead one to ask if the sectarian violence in Tripoli is indeed symptomatic of Syria reasserting itself in Lebanon, or even perhaps the harbinger of a greater conflagration.

Al Jazeera.net reported today that members of the Muslim Brotherhood have erected an online encyclopedia to help inform the public about the organization’s history, ideology, and political aims. Dubbed Ikhwan Wiki, the site is done in the style of the ever popular Wikipedia. Thus, those who want to either edit or contribute content have to register. However, you also have to provide the administrator with your ‘real name’ when registering.

According the editor-in-chief of the Brotherhood’s website, the encyclopedia is not officially under the authority of the group, nor is it tied to its Guidance Bureau. He sees its more as a tool for researchers and journalists, and states that the younger generation of Muslim Brothers believes that the organization’s culture, history, and leadership, need a stronger presence on the Internet.

In recent years a number of Muslim Brothers have utilized Internet-based media platforms, namely blogging, to counter Egypt’s restrictive media culture and provide the organization with an alternative media outlet. Much like the blogging phenomenon, this appears to an effort emanating from the grass-roots level, rather than being driven by the organization’s leadership.

Nonetheless, informing the public about the organization, is perhaps a key ingredient that has been missing from the Brotherhood’s online presence. Since the Brotherhood has been the subject of increased attention in both the fields of journalism and academia in recent years, this could be seen as a move to make sure interested parties are better informed about the organization.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has released part 4 of the series “Knights of Martyrdom”. I previously wrote a post providing an analysis of part 3, which appeared back in July, highlighting indications that the group’s  al-Furqan Media Group was on the decline. Part 4 comes as Iraqi officials claim that the country is now free of the foreign fighters that often heed AQI’s call.

A segment of this latest episode, which appeared on jihadist forums yesterday, is already available on YouTube. In it’s entirety, the video highlights  footage of VBIED attacks underaken by 3 suicide bombers. It also reports on the damage inflicted in these attacks, and features statements made by the martyrs before embarking on their missions.

The attacks featured are as follows:
- One allegedly made against an Iraqi National Guard building in Diyala. In addition to explosives, the vehicle was allegedly loaded with 36,000 liters of poison gas. A number of attacks invovling chlorine gas took place in Iraq in 2007, but I haven’t seen anything yet confirming the info provided by al-Furqan regarding this attack.

- Another against a bridge (claimed to be important to US forces) in the Diyala province city of Ba’qouba, which al-Furqan claims destroyed the bridge and killed 10 Georgian troops. Note, such an attack was reported by Reuters back in May of 2008, but the death toll was reported at 2.

- The third was allegedly made against the directorate of counterterrorism in Baghdad, in which al-Furqan claims AQI destroyed 20 hummers and killed 20 police officers.

While the video also features your staple sound-bites made by Bin Laden, Zarqawi, and Baghdadi, it more interestingly goes out of its way to portray the life of these martyrs as one filled with brotherly love and friendship. For example, the last individual featured  is shown washing his pickup truck before embarking on his mission, then play-fighting with his comrade under the caption, “snapshots depicting the brotherly atmosphere in which Abu Siyaf and his brother Abi ‘Amar al-Jazairi lived, God have mercy upon them” (pictured above). Thus, al-Furqan yet again portrays the life of ‘martyrdom’ as one to be desired.

But can AQI rely solely upon its media capability to attract foreign fighters back to Iraq?

The Washington Post’s “Washington Sketch” program recently featured an interesting piece covering Al Jazeera English’s attempt to cover the Democratic National Convention in nearby Golden, Colorado (video available here). This move to feature ’small-town’ America’s views on the convention was met with much resistance by some if its townspeople who view Al Jazeera as Anti-American, and even “enablers of terrorists”. One woman, demonstrating outside the bar from which Al-Jazeera filmed, described the station as being a “terrorist-sponsored broadcast…place…people”.

Her response leads one to ask if the many Americans really understand what Al Jazeera is, and what Terrorism is for that matter? Why has Al Jazeera come to be seen as a threat in the minds of small-town Americans? It’s worth noting that the station has large audiences in both the UK and Israel.

Golden, Colorado has not been the only flash-point for America’s confrontation with Al Jazeera English. The network’s own “Listening Post” program covered a heated debate in Burlington, Vermont that was sparked by a local cable company’s attempt to feature Al Jazeera English in its repertoire.

Is America ready for Al Jazeera? Maybe not just yet, but perhaps an objective examination of the network is in order.

The Jordanian Ammon News Agency featured a story Wednesday alleging that units of the Iranian Basij are ready to strike throughout the Arab Gulf states if Iran is attacked. In fact, the author describes them as ‘time bombs’ waiting to explode in the region.

The Basij is a large volunteer paramilitary force (estimated at upwards of 400,000) established during the Iran-Iraq War by the Pasdaran (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps). Its rank and file are drawn primarily from Iran’s male population that is either too young or old for regular military service. The Basij achieved notoriety for its “human wave” attacks against the Iraqi Army during the Iran-Iraq War, acting as human shields paving the way for the main Iranian force.

The Basij has also taken up an internal role monitoring civilians and enforcing Islamic codes and laws. Recently, some believe that the Basij has seen a revival since Ahmadinejad took office in 2005. Overall, it’s a hodgepodge entity comprised of various units with different names  (According to Ammon: Hezbullah, Ansar Allah, Jund al-Imam, etc.), entrusted with defending against both internal and external ‘threats’ to the state. Interestingly, the Ammon piece goes on to claim that Iranian opposition groups view the Basij as a despicable organization, referencing their role in the breaking up of demonstrations and enforcing strict Islamic codes. Footage from a recent Basij parade can be viewed here.

The article states the Basij is considered a divine blessing in Iran. One Iranian official reportedly describes its members as the guardians of the Iranian Revolution, called upon when a dead-end situation arises. According to Ammon, Iran has threatened to employ the Basij in suicide operations in the Gulf. A naval commander in the IRCG is cited claiming that there is a plan to strengthen the fighting abilities of the Basij units, as well as assurances that they will cooperate with the IRGC. He goes on to proclaim that, should the situation arise, both would strike in the Gulf theater. Additionally, Iran has alleged as having sleeper cells throughout the Gulf Arab countries, as well as secret platforms (presumably in the Gulf itself) that allow for these cells to cross over into the neighboring Gulf states.

The author concludes the article with a set of doomsday-like predictions in the event that hostilities breakout and these various cells are activated. But is such a scenario realistic?

Although similar threats were made by Iran in October of 2007 amid increasing tensions with the US, these threats did not materialize. A sober analysis of the economic impact of such attacks alone would suggest that it would be equally disastrous for Iran as it would for the Arab Gulf states. But is the situation now closer to the breaking point?

Overall, the alarmist tone of this article perhaps speaks to the psychological reality of the Basij ‘threat’, one that remains fresh in the minds of many in the region almost 30 years after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War.

Hezbollah’s Al-Intiqad newspaper asserts that there are fears over the group’s alleged increased naval capacity. The article cites a report issued by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies back in April 2007 entitled, “Obsolete Weapons, Unconventional Tactics, and Martyrdom Zeal: How Iran Would Apply its Asymmetric Naval Warfare Doctrine in a Future Conflict”(see pp. 33-34).

In addition to its previous use of anti-ship missiles, Al-Intiqad cites information in the Marshall Center report stating that Hezbollah may have also acquired small Chinese-made speedboats, as well as midget submarines since the 2006 conflict. It also asserts that these acquisitions, along with training exercises, are part of preparations to attack Israeli shores in the case of an Israeli attack against Iran. However, the Marshall Center report indicates that this information may very well be exaggerated, a point cited by Al-Intiqad.

The paper goes on to reference expert analysis of Hezbollah’s use of anti-ship missiles during the 2006 war that portrays the groups effective, yet underestimated, defensive capability. The use of a Chinese-made and Iranian-developed C-802 or C-701 missile (there is debate over which weapons system was used) did inflict significant damage on an Israeli ship in the last conflict, which is described in the Marshall Center report as a ’strategic surprise’. Subsequently, Al-Intiqad also cites US  sources that allegedly indicate Hezbollah’s anti-ship capability is now being seen as a potential threat to American warships in the area.

However, it’s worth mentioning that Italian-led UNIFIL naval patrols off the coast of Lebanon, in accordance with UN resolution 1701 (the mandate of which will likely be renewed later this month), would likely complicate efforts by either Hezbollah or Israel to launch an assault by sea. This, in addition to Hezbollah’s yet to be confirmed offensive naval capacity, suggests that hostilities will not likely breakout in the Mediterranean between the two parties.

Furthermore, the fact that the Marshall Center report dates back more than a year begs one to ask, “why is it being highlighted now?”. Perhaps it’s because both Israel and Hezbollah have increasingly threatened each other with military force in recent weeks. The Al-Intiqad story also coincides with an Al-Manar report alleging that Israeli has bought a new destroyer from the US for its navy. Overall, it’s likely that as tensions continue to escalate, so too will the media chest-beating by both parties.

I came across an interesting interview (pasted below) with the chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political department, which was featured on the group’s English language website earlier this month. It covers the organization’s views on the prospects for democracy in Egypt, the role of outside actors in promoting democracy, and other key issues shaping Egyptian political life today.

Transcript of interview with Dr. Mohamed Morsi, Chairman of Muslim Brotherhood Political Department, member of Executive Bureau of MB and ex-member of Egyptian Parliament.*

Attitudes to democracy within the Egyptian population:

How do you view the attitudes within the Egyptian population to the idea of democracy?

Dr.Morsi:All Egyptians want democracy

How do you view the attitude of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt towards the idea of democracy and a democratic government in Egypt?

Dr.Morsi:MB is wholly committed to creating democracy in Egypt, this is one of our main goals.

How do you view the influence of Islam (as culture and religion) with respect to democracy in Egypt? Is Islam a hindrance, is it neutral, or is it a force for democratization?

Dr.Morsi:Islam is a force that works for democracy; the concept of Shura in Islam specifies how the government must rule by the consent of the people; so a government or a society which functions according to Islam will be a democratic society.

Popular support for the government:

How do you view the level of support for Mubarak and his regime within the Egyptian population?

Dr.Morsi:The level of support is very low.

What do you think are the main factors explaining this?

Dr.Morsi:Over time, people have become less and less satisfied with the government, both because of the bad economic situation and the many practical problems that people have in their daily lives, and because people sense clearly that they do not have any influence upon the government.

What do you think is more important in determining the support of Egyptian citizens for the government:
l        The economic situation in the country
l        The degree to which Egyptian government functions according to ’rule of law’ (including protection against wrongful arrest or prosecution, fair trials, equal legal rights for citizens, freedom of speech and of congregation)?
l        The degree of democracy in the country (abolishment of the state of emergency, free and fair elections both to the parliament and to the office of the president)?

The economic situation in the country is the most important factor

How do you explain this?

Dr.Morsi:People also care about whether this country is a democracy or not, but they have to deal with issues of survival first, before they can deal with abstract principles of democracy.

Influences from abroad:

How do you view the influence of foreign states and organisations in terms of promoting or hindering democracy in Egypt?

Dr.Morsi:The international community doesn’t really exert a pressure for democratization on Egypt.

How do you view the influence of the USA in terms of promoting or hindering democracy in Egypt?

Dr.Morsi:The United States has done nothing to promote democracy in Egypt despite its claims to the contrary.

How do you view the influence of the European Union in terms of promoting or hindering democracy in Egypt?

Dr.Morsi: (While ordinary people in Europe want democracy in Egypt as well, their political leaders does very little to affect this, partly because they are being prevented in this by the United States)

How do you view the influence of other Arab countries in terms of promoting or hindering democracy in Egypt?d

Dr.Morsi:The other Arab countries are not democracies themselves, so they cannot support democracy in Egypt. But if Egypt were to become a democracy, it could help to spread democracy to other Arab countries.

What effect, if any, does the Israeli/Palestinian conflict have on the prospect of democratization in Egypt?

Dr.Morsi:Israel has an interest in Egypt being non-democratic, for a democratic regime in Egypt would do more to support the Palestinians.

Possibilities for democratization:

What do you consider the main obstacles for democratization in Egypt?

Dr.Morsi:The regime and its undemocratic practices; suppression of people’s rights, arresting people etc. etc.

Which are the main forces promoting democracy in Egypt?

Dr.Morsi:The Muslim Brotherhood and the people of Egypt; there has been a slow and gradual development of desire for democracy in Egypt. People feel how they are excluded from the decision-making process and resent this, and the mass-media, satellite TV etc. make people more aware what is happening everywhere in the world. This in turn influences people’s consciousness and make their desire for democracy stronger. The other opposition parties in parliament are also working for democracy, although they are weak and do not have much popular support.

How do you view the likelihood that the president and NDP will voluntarily begin a process of democratization?

Dr.Morsi:I do not consider this to be a realistic possibility.

What do you consider the most likely way in which Egypt could become a more democratic society? (The most likely scenario for democratization)

Dr.Morsi:We in the Muslim Brotherhood are trying to create a democratic development in Egypt in a slow and gradual way. We believe this development must take place without violence (Islam forbids using violence against people, or a regime), since we don’t think violence will help create a well-functionining society or democracy. This slow and gradual development requires patience and the ability to endure the hardship, injustice and suffering that is inflicted upon us by the regime, but we believe that this is the right way to do it.

*This interview was conducted by Mikkel Kaastrup, a Danish researcher who is writing a thesis about the prospects for democratization in Egypt, the department of International Development Studies, Roskilde University, Denmark. It was attended by Ikhwanweb.

Today’s meeting between Syrian and Russian presidents Bashar al-Asad and Dmitri Medvedev in the Black Sea port of Sochi have some fearing that the old battle-lines of the cold war era are once again reemerging in the Middle East.

Al-Jazeera’s coverage touched upon the most potentially sensitive aspect of any reinvigorated partnership; the prospect of Russian ballistic missiles being sent to Syria. According to Al-Jazeera, Russian news coverage alleged that al-Asad had welcomed the idea of Russian Iskander missile systems being deployed to Syria while Israeli media sources indicated that Russia plans to deploy the missile systems in the Baltic and in Syria to counter America’s missile shield in Central Europe and in response to Israeli-American military aid to Georgia.

Despite these claims, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was cited by Al-Jazeera as stating that any weapons deals with Syria would be on the condition that they would not disturb the ‘balance of power’ in the region.

Although Syria’s own SANA News Agency did not explicitly mention the missile issue, it did state that the two countries discussed means to bring about peace in the region, leading one to assume that this would include strategic issues, such as the deployment of ballistic missiles, and how they may be just one aspect of an overall policy by Russia to embolden its friends in the region against US-Israeli strategic dominance. Interestingly, part of SANA’s coverage of the meeting also highlights al-Asad’s outspoken support for Russia’s actions, in which he states that Syria denounces attempts by many to distort Russia’s image in light of developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

While it’s debatable at this point to what extent the Russian-Syrian ‘partnership’ will develop in military terms, the circumstances surrounding al-Asad and Medvedev’s meeting remind us that the bi-polar power balance between superpowers may once again leave its mark on the Middle East.

Nine years after the Jordanian government broke off its ties with Hamas, the independent Jordanian AmmonNews agency reported on Sunday that the evolving regional situation, and the kingdom’s desire to ease tensions with the Muslim Brotherhood , are pushing the Hashemite regime to normalize relations with the Palestinian group.

However, the article states that this is should not be taken as an indication the Jordanian government is deviating from its policy of supporting a two-state solution and its strategic alliance with the US. It goes on to mention meetings that were held between officials from the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) and Hamas representatives last month, a development that was reported in more detail by Al-Ghad at the end of last month. These meetings were apparently significant since Hamas’s own media office in Jordan was closed and its representatives in Jordan forced to leave the country in 1999 (Note: the picture above was taken around the time of their expulsion).

Ammon’s report suggests that both parties are playing a delicate game of improving their positions in the pursuit of their interests while maintaining their traditionally outspoken, and often opposing, agendas. In exchange for Jordan exercising more neutrality in Palestinian issues, the author indicates that Hamas will cease instigating tensions within Jordan via its relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist groups in the country who were recently weakened in controversial parliamentary and municipal elections.

Overall these developments suggest that as Hamas takes on a more active role as a domestic Palestinian political actor, it also has the ability to influence trends outside the Occupied Territories. However, despite the apparent necessity for both parties to improve relations with one another, one might question if this ‘mutual’ feeling will survive any downturn in either regional or local tensions.