Middle East Media

Nine years after the Jordanian government broke off its ties with Hamas, the independent Jordanian AmmonNews agency reported on Sunday that the evolving regional situation, and the kingdom’s desire to ease tensions with the Muslim Brotherhood , are pushing the Hashemite regime to normalize relations with the Palestinian group.

However, the article states that this is should not be taken as an indication the Jordanian government is deviating from its policy of supporting a two-state solution and its strategic alliance with the US. It goes on to mention meetings that were held between officials from the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) and Hamas representatives last month, a development that was reported in more detail by Al-Ghad at the end of last month. These meetings were apparently significant since Hamas’s own media office in Jordan was closed and its representatives in Jordan forced to leave the country in 1999 (Note: the picture above was taken around the time of their expulsion).

Ammon’s report suggests that both parties are playing a delicate game of improving their positions in the pursuit of their interests while maintaining their traditionally outspoken, and often opposing, agendas. In exchange for Jordan exercising more neutrality in Palestinian issues, the author indicates that Hamas will cease instigating tensions within Jordan via its relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist groups in the country who were recently weakened in controversial parliamentary and municipal elections.

Overall these developments suggest that as Hamas takes on a more active role as a domestic Palestinian political actor, it also has the ability to influence trends outside the Occupied Territories. However, despite the apparent necessity for both parties to improve relations with one another, one might question if this ‘mutual’ feeling will survive any downturn in either regional or local tensions.

Hezbollah’s media relations department stated today that the group would release a MOU with salafist groups this coming Monday at the Safir hotel in Beirut. Note that the most of the various salafist entities in Lebanon are not tied to jihadist terrorism (see here).

This move by Hezbollah will likely be cause for concern within Saad Hariri’s Future Movement in that it can be seen as an attempt by Hezbollah to garner support from a constituency whose support has been previously sought and enjoyed by Hariri. Overall, this move could be motivated by a desire for Hezbollah to increase its influence in the predominantly Sunni north Lebanon for the upcoming 2009 parliamentary elections.

(Updated) According to Al-Akhbar’s coverage of these developments, leadership of the salafist Waqf al-Turath al-Islami (Endowment for Islamic Heritage) has been holding meetings with Hezbollah representatives the past few months. Al-Akhbar cites sources allegedly close to the organization as stating that many within the salafist community are expected to attend Monday’s announcement. When compared to salafist-jihadist groups, Waqf’s political line can be considered relatively moderate. For example, I came across a fatwa issued by the organization in November of last year - allegedly distributed to mosques in the Tripoli area - that discouraged individuals from embarking for jihad in Iraq.

The memorandum comes shortly after a bus bombing killed 9 members of the Lebanese Army in the northern city of Tripoli, in which many have alleged the involvement of a salafist-jihadist group (i.e. Fatah al-Islam). However, this move should be seen within the broader context of ongoing sectarian clashes between Sunnis and Alawites in Tripoli. The Alawites of the Bal Mohsen sector of the city have be painted as acting on behalf of the Hezbollah-led opposition. Thus, this move can be seen as an important political move to improve/build the group’s credibility in north Lebanon. In some regards, its reminiscent of the 2006 MOU between Hezbollah and the largely Christian Free Patriotic Movement, which proved to be vital to the strength of Lebanon’s parliamentary opposition in recent political developments.

Will this new inter-sectarian ‘understanding’ further solidify Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon, or will it only further subject it to the norms of Lebanese national politics?

Last week, the Saudi reformist daily Al-Watan featured an article criticizing Iran’s recent threat to block the Strait of Hormuz, describing it as ’suicide’.  The threat was reportedly voiced by Muhammad Ali Jaafari, the head of Iran’s Republican Guard Corps (RGC), after the US warned Iran to respond in a positive manner to an ultimatum on an incentives package offered by global powers to freeze its nuclear program. Jaafari’s statement has subsequently been highly criticized by representatives from the Arab GCC states (i.e. Kuwait), and, apparently, by media outlets in that region such as Al-Watan.

Since 40 percent of the world’s oil passes through Hormuz, it’s blockage would likely send oil prices soaring. Subsequently, the article argues that, while Iran claims that it has the ability to easily shutdown the strait, such a move would be foolish since it would unite the international community against it. The author even goes on to describe the statement as the hangman’s ‘rope’ around Iran’s neck.

The negative response to Iranian threats to blockade the strait leads one to ponder whether it will prove to be an asset or a liability for Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran closes down the strait, GCC-member states may be compelled to advocate for US military action against Iran. Ironically, while the GCC has previously used the ‘oil weapon’ to economically weaken Iran, the council’s dependency on oil power itself might force it to plea for US military intervention in the event that Iran moves to close the Strait of Hormuz.

The past few days have seen a number of press reports, issued by both Arab and Israeli media outlets, commenting on Hezbollah’s military buildup and Israel’s corresponding concern.

While the replenishment and expansion of Hezbollah’s artillery rocket arsenal has repeatedly been cited since the end of the 2006 conflict, perhaps the most important recent development has been its alleged acquisition of anti-aircraft missiles. This comes as Israel’s cabinet was presented with an assessment today of the Hezbollah threat and as the group has voiced its desire to end Israeli Air Force (IAF) sorties over Lebanon. The group’s ability to do this may threaten the IAF’s ability to conduct reconnaissance flights over Lebanon, as well as its ability to provide air support to ground troops in Lebanon in the event of another conflict.

Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV subsequently issued a report today touching upon these alleged developments, claiming they have created anxiety within Israel’s security establishment. An article in the Lebanese pro-opposition daily Al-Akhbar also speculated - citing an Israeli media report - that today’s cabinet meeting in Israel would reveal a discouraging security situation. The article also cited Israeli media reports published at the end of last week  indicating that Hezbollah was working to put into place Russian-made SA-8 (currently found in Syria) and SA-15 (further developed in Iran) missile systems.

It appears that the advancement in Hezbollah’s military capabilities have become increasingly worrisome since it coincides with an expected Lebanese cabinet policy statement granting the group the right to keep its weapons. Thus, while fears over Hezbollah’s ability to achieve both strategic and political victories may lead to an Israeli military response, such a response would likely be surgical and limited in its nature in order to avoid giving the group any increased political capital, which would likely result from significant collateral damage and civilian casualties.

The program “What’s Next?” on Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV recently featured the first interview (accessible here) with the recently released Samir Quntar. In the interview, Quntar symbolically wears a Hezbollah-styled uniform with a Lebanese flag arm patch. He speaks about the kidnapping operation he took part in, as well as the military achievements of Hezbollah’s resistance. A surprise appearance by the mother and brother of one of Quntar’s prison mates is also included in the interview via satellite from Gaza.

Overall, I’d say the presentation of Quntar’s persona and narrative in this program is representative of how the notion of Arab ‘resistance’ has evolved over the decades as multifaceted concept. At the time of his capture in the 1970’s Quntar was representative of the garden variety resistance fighter of that time; a Lebanese Druze who took up arms on behalf of the Palestinian cause by joining the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) organization. In fact, he is described by the presenter as being Lebanese by birth, Palestinian in mind and spirit, Arab in association, and a believer in the path of resistance since the age of 15.

This notion of Palestinian-led Arab resistance has given way today to Hezbollah’s own ‘resistance’; one that fluctuates between having a Lebanese, Islamist, and Arab face. So perhaps it’s appropot that Quntar was released as a result of Hezbollah’s efforts as today’s vanguard of ‘resistance’ in the Arab world. Now, as a de facto spokesperson for the organization, he may even be seen as representing Hezbollah’s ever-evolving political goals and interests.

However, one then might ask how long can Hezbollah ride the resistance wave afforded by the Palestinian issue?  Would the eventual release of more prisoners and a Palestinian-Israeli peace deal jeopardize it’s ability to regionalize its influence?

In something that resembled more of a rock concert than your traditional Hezbollah rally, the party’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah made a rare in-person appearance on stage this evening at a ceremony celebrating the return of Hezbollah’s prisoners exchanged for the bodies of  two Israeli soldiers. Nasrallah has typically appeared live to his audience televised from an undisclosed location due to the threat of assassination.

Footage of Nasrallah’s appearance at this event can be seen here on YouTube. After greeting the prisoners, he gives the crowd a quick pep talk, telling them how they’ve shown everybody that they cannot be defeated. In a joking manner, he then promises the crowd that he won’t later be speaking on the screen for too long as he usually does.

In addition to four Hezbollah prisoners taken during the 2006 war with Israel, the exchange also included Samir Quntar, a Lebanese individual who belonged to a Palestinian militant group. While Hezbollah was not yet formed when Quntar was captured in 1979, his status as a ‘resistance’ figure propelled him into the spotlight in the group’s ongoing campaign to free prisoners from Israeli jails. This effort culminated with the group’s attempt to take additional Israeli prisoners for leverage in the summer of 2006, which sparked the war of that summer. Given Quntar’s unique status, it perhaps comes to no surprise that he was outfitted with new Hezbollah gear for the celebration ceremony.

On a side note, an interview with one of the Hezbollah prisoners involved in the deal, Ali Hassan Suleiman (who was captured during the 2006 war), is available here. Note, I can’t vouch for the commentary provided by the person who posted the video, but the translation is relatively accurate. The interview, apparently done while Suleiman was incarcerated, provides some insight into the background of Hezbollah fighters.

In Nasrallah’s televised speech later on, he stressed that the three major factors that led to the release of the prisoners were the steadfastness of the Resistance, the secrecy of the Israeli prisoners’ status, and the weakness of the enemy. The release of the prisoners will likely encourage Hezbollah to shift its focus to the territorial disputes of Shebaa Farms and the Kfar Shouba Hills. While these issues could be settled through third-party intermediaries, the momentum gained by Hezbollah as a result of the prisoner swap won’t likely motivate them to take a conciliatory stance on these territorial grievances.

Al-Jazeera.net is conducting an interesting survey. In light of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates’ recent decision to name ambassadors to Iraq, the network’s website is asking for feedback from its viewers on the issue.

While sending ambassadors to a fellow Arab nation may not seem controversial at first, the questions being asked in the survey imply that many may view this move by the two Gulf states as implicitly condoning the occupation of Iraq, as well as obligating other Arab countries to follow their lead.

For example, it asks “Is it necessary for the Arab states to follow suit with the two countries?, and, “Do you think that naming ambassadors to Baghdad grants legitimacy to the Occupation there?”.

One respondent from the UAE, identifying himself as an academic political figure, condones his country’s move, pointing to the importance of the Arab countries to establish their agenda in Iraq in the face of a competing Iranian one. He sees the UAE as opening the door for this process to take place.

Another, identifying himself as a political analyst from Egypt, claims that the US is applying pressure on the Arab states to undergo these steps in order to legitimize its presence in the country, while at the same time he acknowledges that such action by the Arab states may send a message of solidarity.

Meanwhile, a Syrian author and journalist states that establishing diplomatic ties in Iraq should be considered a national duty for the Arab states, adding that diplomatic representation is a positive step towards a safer political/security situation there.

While responses to the survey are not yet many, they are extensive and provide some insight into how Arabs perceive Iraq as a regional issue. Despite the stigma of the occupation and alleged US pressure, there may be a general understanding that the Arab states need to become more involved in Iraq’s future. Given the prospect of increased Iranian influence in Iraq, the need for an increased Arab presence in Iraq may be taking on strategic importance as well for many of the Arab states, especially those in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

I came across a video produced by Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s al-Furqan media group this weekend. It was posted earlier this week in a jihadist internet forum, but is now also available on YouTube. The video is the third part of a series entitled, “The Knights of Martyrdom”.

While I haven’t seen part 2, I have seen the first one, which was issued back in March of 2007.  From what I remember, many aspects of this most recent episode are consistent with that of the previous one, using many of the same sound-bites, motifs, and production techniques.

Contrary to the timing of this part’s release, the attacks covered in the film date back as far as the summer of 2005. Perhaps the most significant of these was the destruction of both the Badush and Aski-Mosul bridges in the province of Ninawa in May of 2007 in multiple VBIED attacks.  The incident was covered by western media, which revealed that it was part of a larger campaign undertaken by the group in that region.

In its entirety, the film covers several attacks, with each segment featuring the execution of the attack, a scorecard of its achievements, and video footage of a will read by an individual killed in the operation. In addition to the bridge operations, several attacks allegedly executed in Tal Afar are also featured, including one that appears to date back to July of 2005. While much of the details of the attacks are highlighted, the dates of their execution are not presented to the viewer. However, anyone able to cross-reference some of the information provided in the videos with mainstream sources could come up with the dates of the attacks.

Part 3 of “The Knights of Martyrdom” comes at a time when AQI, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq, has experienced serious setbacks in Iraq over the past year, which has most recently taken on the form of a serious crackdown on the group in its last known ’stronghold’ of Mosul.

This might be why AQI has featured dated footage in this episode of the video series, leaving one to conclude that - by presenting itself in this manner - AQI is attempting to maintain a  media presence that suggests operational strength in order to compensate for its losses on the ground. One might also conclude that this may be  indicative of AQI’s  inability to produce media content derived from the ‘field’ in a timely manner. Such a scenario could be the result of efforts to take down al-Furqan dating back to late last year.

Thus, this latest episode of the “Knights of Martyrdom” may be more indicative of an organization on the decline, rather than one on the rebound. In terms of its media campaign, highlighting major attacks - such as the Badush bridge operation - may ensure the group visibility. However, it also opens the door for the public to refer to mainstream media coverage of those events to delineate inconsistencies and unflattering trends in the group’s capacity as both a military and media entity.

A report in yesterday’s As-Safir covered a recent press conference given by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. According to the pro-opposition Lebanese daily, al-Assad voiced that the US’s role in any future peace deal with Israel is essential, and is one that cannot be matched by any European country. He stated that this is primarily due to the US’s close relationship with Israel, who he believes is more serious - ‘to a certain extent’- about peace than it was in 2000.

His comments came shortly before his departure for France to meet with French President Nicolas Sarkozy, to whom he attributes the improvement in Franco-Syrian relations. In Paris, the Syrian president will also be taking part in a Mediterranean summit and will be meeting with new Lebanese President Michel Suleiman. Under Jacques Chirac, relations between Syria and France went cold, especially after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

The Syrian president also made a few comments on security cooperation with the US. He claims that, although Syria attempted to cooperate with the US on counter-terrorism after 9-11, the two countries did not agree as to who should be leading such operations. According to al-Assad, after security relations with the US were cut off in early 2004, Syria refused US attempts to have the relations reestablished, stating that there would be “No security relations [with the US] without political relations.”

US media reported this relationship ending in May of 2005 against the backdrop of of the Hariri assassination and Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. Note that Syria has served as a port of entry for Iraq-bound insurgents/foreign fighters since the beginning of the war.

Although it’s not clear if the Iraq situation is specifically what al-Assad is referring to here in terms of cooperation, it’s likely that Syria will continue to bank on its ‘utility’ in counter-terrorism operations, and in curbing the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq, as a means to facilitate a form of US participation in future talks with Israel that is more conducive to its interests.

The front page of Al-Akhbar’s Tuesday edition features news of the upcoming release of a Hezbollah music video celebrating the second anniversary of the July War of 2006. Subsequently, the name of the of the video is tammuz, which translates simply as July. According to the pro-opposition Lebanese daily, the picture at the bottom of this post was taken during the video’s production. The profile depicted on the flags is that of the group’s assassinated paramilitary leader Imad Mughniyeh.

This is not the first time that Hezbollah has produced a music video commemorating the ‘06 conflict. Last July, the group released one entitled, “The Victory of the Arabs”. The video frames the July War as an Arab victory through its imagery and message in an effort to capitalize on Hezbollah’s standing as the only Arab force to have ‘defeated’ Israel. You can read more about it in an article I wrote here, while those who wish to view the video can do so here: link

At this rate, it appears that Hezbollah will be releasing a new music video every July. It might be hard though to top the level of production work and resources that went into the making of “The Victory of the Arabs”. According to Al-Akhbar, members of the Lebanese Army participated in this year’s video. Therefore, I’m thinking that they’ll go for a more nationalistic angle this time around. I’ll try to post a copy of the video once it’s available online.

UPDATE: The new video can be viewed here on YouTube.