Middle East Media

The past few days have seen a number of press reports, issued by both Arab and Israeli media outlets, commenting on Hezbollah’s military buildup and Israel’s corresponding concern.

While the replenishment and expansion of Hezbollah’s artillery rocket arsenal has repeatedly been cited since the end of the 2006 conflict, perhaps the most important recent development has been its alleged acquisition of anti-aircraft missiles. This comes as Israel’s cabinet was presented with an assessment today of the Hezbollah threat and as the group has voiced its desire to end Israeli Air Force (IAF) sorties over Lebanon. The group’s ability to do this may threaten the IAF’s ability to conduct reconnaissance flights over Lebanon, as well as its ability to provide air support to ground troops in Lebanon in the event of another conflict.

Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV subsequently issued a report today touching upon these alleged developments, claiming they have created anxiety within Israel’s security establishment. An article in the Lebanese pro-opposition daily Al-Akhbar also speculated - citing an Israeli media report - that today’s cabinet meeting in Israel would reveal a discouraging security situation. The article also cited Israeli media reports published at the end of last week  indicating that Hezbollah was working to put into place Russian-made SA-8 (currently found in Syria) and SA-15 (further developed in Iran) missile systems.

It appears that the advancement in Hezbollah’s military capabilities have become increasingly worrisome since it coincides with an expected Lebanese cabinet policy statement granting the group the right to keep its weapons. Thus, while fears over Hezbollah’s ability to achieve both strategic and political victories may lead to an Israeli military response, such a response would likely be surgical and limited in its nature in order to avoid giving the group any increased political capital, which would likely result from significant collateral damage and civilian casualties.

The Hamas-affiliated Palestinian Information Center (PIC) today featured a report and photos detailing weapons allegedly confiscated by Hamas-allied police in Gaza. The weapons, displayed during a press conference, were allegedly confiscated by police as part of security measures initiated last weekend.

According to the PIC report, a police explosives expert stated that some of the devices collected in search operations match those involved in the bombing near Gaza beach last week, an event which triggered the outbreak of violence between Hamas and Fatah factions.

Police claim that militants took refuge in an area of Gaza City inhabited by the Halas clan, the members of which are pro-Fatah and have previously clashed with Hamas. Members of the clan reportedly include a leading Fatah official in Gaza, and were involved in clashes with police yesterday.

While police apparently aimed to incriminate the Halas clan in last weeks bombing, the family issued a statement a few days ago denying any involvement in the incident.

Today’s report comes a day after Al-Quds reported that Israel had allowed members of the Halas clan - accused of being involved in a bombing in June - to take refuge in Israel as they headed to the West Bank. However, the AP also indicated that President Mahmoud Abbas told Fatah fighters  to return to Gaza, insisting that a Fatah presence be maintained there. It’s not clear, however, if the fighters mentioned in the AP report were also affiliated with the Halas clan.

Hamas’s apparent attempt to implicate the Halas clan in last week’s bombing could be part of an ongoing campaign to eradicate Fatah’s foothold in Gaza City. It also suggests that clan identities, and how they interplay with political affiliations, need to be taken into account when understanding the nature of the conflict in Gaza.

Al-Jazeera’s website featured some video coverage of Hamas’s security crackdown that followed a deadly car bombing in the Gaza Strip this past weekend. It can be viewed here: (link)

Subsequently, this has been met with raids by Fatah-allied Palestinian police against Hamas elements in the West Bank.

While Hamas-allied police forces in Gaza state that increased security measures are necessary to maintain the peace, Fatah’s leadership in Gaza has termed these measures as being ‘random’ and not serving the interest of national security.

In addition to revitalized Fatah-Hamas tensions that have followed these events, Al-Jazeera’s coverage also states that Hamas-allied police and the Army of Islam, an allegedly al-Qaeda-affiliated group based in Gaza famous for its kidnapping of British journalist Alan Johnston last year.

While these events reveal the complex nature of the security situation in Gaza, there are reportedly indications that Egypt will initiate talks between Fatah and Hamas in an effort to diffuse the situation. However, the overall situation is indicative of the extent to which the security sectors in the West Bank and Gaza have diverged along political lines.

Today’s bulldozer attack in Jerusalem is the second of its kind in the West Bank this month. After the previous July 2nd attack, I wrote a post suggesting that this could be part of an emerging trend in the area, whereby groups/individuals may be employing low-tech and non-traditional forms of terrorism to counter the security environment. While no group has claimed responsibility for today’s attack, the incident further encourages us to consider if there is indeed a developing trend.

According to Al-Jazeera’s reporting, today’s attack took place close to the hotel where Barack Obama is due to stay during his visit, the area around which has subsequently witnessed heightened security measures in recent days. Ironically, the first to respond to the incident was a civilian licensed to carry a firearm, not the police.

It’s worth noting that the resources that enable one to undertake such an attack are perhaps too diffuse for the authorities to completely control or monitor, even in the West Bank. The fact that the perpetrators of these attacks had the ability to move freely within Israel and the Occupied Territories also suggests that this type of threat cannot be countered by increased restrictions/closures at entry points into the West Bank.

If this trend takes on a political face it would raise some interesting questions, such as:  Is there an effective way to counter this type of threat? And, would it enable second-tier terrorist groups, ones that don’t possess significant resources, to compete for the limelight?

The program “What’s Next?” on Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV recently featured the first interview (accessible here) with the recently released Samir Quntar. In the interview, Quntar symbolically wears a Hezbollah-styled uniform with a Lebanese flag arm patch. He speaks about the kidnapping operation he took part in, as well as the military achievements of Hezbollah’s resistance. A surprise appearance by the mother and brother of one of Quntar’s prison mates is also included in the interview via satellite from Gaza.

Overall, I’d say the presentation of Quntar’s persona and narrative in this program is representative of how the notion of Arab ‘resistance’ has evolved over the decades as multifaceted concept. At the time of his capture in the 1970’s Quntar was representative of the garden variety resistance fighter of that time; a Lebanese Druze who took up arms on behalf of the Palestinian cause by joining the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) organization. In fact, he is described by the presenter as being Lebanese by birth, Palestinian in mind and spirit, Arab in association, and a believer in the path of resistance since the age of 15.

This notion of Palestinian-led Arab resistance has given way today to Hezbollah’s own ‘resistance’; one that fluctuates between having a Lebanese, Islamist, and Arab face. So perhaps it’s appropot that Quntar was released as a result of Hezbollah’s efforts as today’s vanguard of ‘resistance’ in the Arab world. Now, as a de facto spokesperson for the organization, he may even be seen as representing Hezbollah’s ever-evolving political goals and interests.

However, one then might ask how long can Hezbollah ride the resistance wave afforded by the Palestinian issue?  Would the eventual release of more prisoners and a Palestinian-Israeli peace deal jeopardize it’s ability to regionalize its influence?

In something that resembled more of a rock concert than your traditional Hezbollah rally, the party’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah made a rare in-person appearance on stage this evening at a ceremony celebrating the return of Hezbollah’s prisoners exchanged for the bodies of  two Israeli soldiers. Nasrallah has typically appeared live to his audience televised from an undisclosed location due to the threat of assassination.

Footage of Nasrallah’s appearance at this event can be seen here on YouTube. After greeting the prisoners, he gives the crowd a quick pep talk, telling them how they’ve shown everybody that they cannot be defeated. In a joking manner, he then promises the crowd that he won’t later be speaking on the screen for too long as he usually does.

In addition to four Hezbollah prisoners taken during the 2006 war with Israel, the exchange also included Samir Quntar, a Lebanese individual who belonged to a Palestinian militant group. While Hezbollah was not yet formed when Quntar was captured in 1979, his status as a ‘resistance’ figure propelled him into the spotlight in the group’s ongoing campaign to free prisoners from Israeli jails. This effort culminated with the group’s attempt to take additional Israeli prisoners for leverage in the summer of 2006, which sparked the war of that summer. Given Quntar’s unique status, it perhaps comes to no surprise that he was outfitted with new Hezbollah gear for the celebration ceremony.

On a side note, an interview with one of the Hezbollah prisoners involved in the deal, Ali Hassan Suleiman (who was captured during the 2006 war), is available here. Note, I can’t vouch for the commentary provided by the person who posted the video, but the translation is relatively accurate. The interview, apparently done while Suleiman was incarcerated, provides some insight into the background of Hezbollah fighters.

In Nasrallah’s televised speech later on, he stressed that the three major factors that led to the release of the prisoners were the steadfastness of the Resistance, the secrecy of the Israeli prisoners’ status, and the weakness of the enemy. The release of the prisoners will likely encourage Hezbollah to shift its focus to the territorial disputes of Shebaa Farms and the Kfar Shouba Hills. While these issues could be settled through third-party intermediaries, the momentum gained by Hezbollah as a result of the prisoner swap won’t likely motivate them to take a conciliatory stance on these territorial grievances.

Al-Jazeera.net is conducting an interesting survey. In light of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates’ recent decision to name ambassadors to Iraq, the network’s website is asking for feedback from its viewers on the issue.

While sending ambassadors to a fellow Arab nation may not seem controversial at first, the questions being asked in the survey imply that many may view this move by the two Gulf states as implicitly condoning the occupation of Iraq, as well as obligating other Arab countries to follow their lead.

For example, it asks “Is it necessary for the Arab states to follow suit with the two countries?, and, “Do you think that naming ambassadors to Baghdad grants legitimacy to the Occupation there?”.

One respondent from the UAE, identifying himself as an academic political figure, condones his country’s move, pointing to the importance of the Arab countries to establish their agenda in Iraq in the face of a competing Iranian one. He sees the UAE as opening the door for this process to take place.

Another, identifying himself as a political analyst from Egypt, claims that the US is applying pressure on the Arab states to undergo these steps in order to legitimize its presence in the country, while at the same time he acknowledges that such action by the Arab states may send a message of solidarity.

Meanwhile, a Syrian author and journalist states that establishing diplomatic ties in Iraq should be considered a national duty for the Arab states, adding that diplomatic representation is a positive step towards a safer political/security situation there.

While responses to the survey are not yet many, they are extensive and provide some insight into how Arabs perceive Iraq as a regional issue. Despite the stigma of the occupation and alleged US pressure, there may be a general understanding that the Arab states need to become more involved in Iraq’s future. Given the prospect of increased Iranian influence in Iraq, the need for an increased Arab presence in Iraq may be taking on strategic importance as well for many of the Arab states, especially those in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

I came across a video produced by Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s al-Furqan media group this weekend. It was posted earlier this week in a jihadist internet forum, but is now also available on YouTube. The video is the third part of a series entitled, “The Knights of Martyrdom”.

While I haven’t seen part 2, I have seen the first one, which was issued back in March of 2007.  From what I remember, many aspects of this most recent episode are consistent with that of the previous one, using many of the same sound-bites, motifs, and production techniques.

Contrary to the timing of this part’s release, the attacks covered in the film date back as far as the summer of 2005. Perhaps the most significant of these was the destruction of both the Badush and Aski-Mosul bridges in the province of Ninawa in May of 2007 in multiple VBIED attacks.  The incident was covered by western media, which revealed that it was part of a larger campaign undertaken by the group in that region.

In its entirety, the film covers several attacks, with each segment featuring the execution of the attack, a scorecard of its achievements, and video footage of a will read by an individual killed in the operation. In addition to the bridge operations, several attacks allegedly executed in Tal Afar are also featured, including one that appears to date back to July of 2005. While much of the details of the attacks are highlighted, the dates of their execution are not presented to the viewer. However, anyone able to cross-reference some of the information provided in the videos with mainstream sources could come up with the dates of the attacks.

Part 3 of “The Knights of Martyrdom” comes at a time when AQI, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq, has experienced serious setbacks in Iraq over the past year, which has most recently taken on the form of a serious crackdown on the group in its last known ’stronghold’ of Mosul.

This might be why AQI has featured dated footage in this episode of the video series, leaving one to conclude that - by presenting itself in this manner - AQI is attempting to maintain a  media presence that suggests operational strength in order to compensate for its losses on the ground. One might also conclude that this may be  indicative of AQI’s  inability to produce media content derived from the ‘field’ in a timely manner. Such a scenario could be the result of efforts to take down al-Furqan dating back to late last year.

Thus, this latest episode of the “Knights of Martyrdom” may be more indicative of an organization on the decline, rather than one on the rebound. In terms of its media campaign, highlighting major attacks - such as the Badush bridge operation - may ensure the group visibility. However, it also opens the door for the public to refer to mainstream media coverage of those events to delineate inconsistencies and unflattering trends in the group’s capacity as both a military and media entity.

A report in yesterday’s As-Safir covered a recent press conference given by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. According to the pro-opposition Lebanese daily, al-Assad voiced that the US’s role in any future peace deal with Israel is essential, and is one that cannot be matched by any European country. He stated that this is primarily due to the US’s close relationship with Israel, who he believes is more serious - ‘to a certain extent’- about peace than it was in 2000.

His comments came shortly before his departure for France to meet with French President Nicolas Sarkozy, to whom he attributes the improvement in Franco-Syrian relations. In Paris, the Syrian president will also be taking part in a Mediterranean summit and will be meeting with new Lebanese President Michel Suleiman. Under Jacques Chirac, relations between Syria and France went cold, especially after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

The Syrian president also made a few comments on security cooperation with the US. He claims that, although Syria attempted to cooperate with the US on counter-terrorism after 9-11, the two countries did not agree as to who should be leading such operations. According to al-Assad, after security relations with the US were cut off in early 2004, Syria refused US attempts to have the relations reestablished, stating that there would be “No security relations [with the US] without political relations.”

US media reported this relationship ending in May of 2005 against the backdrop of of the Hariri assassination and Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. Note that Syria has served as a port of entry for Iraq-bound insurgents/foreign fighters since the beginning of the war.

Although it’s not clear if the Iraq situation is specifically what al-Assad is referring to here in terms of cooperation, it’s likely that Syria will continue to bank on its ‘utility’ in counter-terrorism operations, and in curbing the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq, as a means to facilitate a form of US participation in future talks with Israel that is more conducive to its interests.

Sorry it’s been a few days since my last blog entry. I’ve been busy travelling, and have also had some serious computer issues to deal with.

Anyways, I came across an interesting report featured on the Dutch-funded Menasset.com. It covers a conference recently held between journalists from both  Hamas and Fatah factions addressing media issues that have helped sustain and promote internal conflict.

The Palestinian ambassador to Egypt said internal media awareness is necessary to help settle the internal political crisis. The article also takes note of how internet-based media have facilitated increased tensions between constituents of the two opposing camps.

Although fair and balanced reporting amongst professional journalists would be a contributing factor to any internal rapprochement between the two parties, in my opinion, internet-based media promoting violence may prove too elusive to curb.